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We  develop  a  model  of  trade  with  imperfect  competition  to  study  the  welfare 
implications  in  developing  and  developed  countries  of  the  asymmetry  in  attitudes 
towards foreign products. In the developed country, consumers benefit from a better 
perception of foreign products while the rental rate of capital declines as long as the 
location  of  capital  remains  unchanged.  However,  when  capital  is  mobile,  the 
developing  country  hosts  more  and  more  capital  at  the  expense  of  the  developed 
country as the perception of varieties produced in the developed country improves and 
the surplus of consumers in the developed country can decrease. 
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1. Introduction 
Different studies in marketing and economic psychology show consumers attach different 
values  to products  which are  otherwise  identical but produced in different  countries.  Although 
numerous  studies reveal that  country  of origin  matters,  standard  economic  theory  of  trade  and 
location does not consider this element in consumers and firms behaviour. 
  A large body of research is dedicated on country of origin effects on product evaluation 
such as perceived quality, attitudes and purchase intentions (see Peterson and Jolibert, 1995, for a 
survey). Product country images contain not only cognitive and affective aspects but also normative 
aspects  such  as  “buy  domestic”,  “consumer  ethnocentrism”  and  “customer  voting”
1.  Numerous 
studies  show  that  country  of  origin  influences  significantly  product  evaluation.    From  a  meta 
analysis of country of origin research, Verlegh and Steenkamp (1999) show that the country’ level 
of development matters in product evaluation. Products from Less Developed Countries (LDC) 
appear to be evaluated less positively than products from Developed Countries (DC).
 For example, 
US  consumers  (resp.,  Canadian)  consumers  are,  ceteris  paribus,  more  disposed  to  purchase 
Canadian (resp., US) products than Mexican products (Lantz and Loeb, 1996). At the opposite, 
Indians,  South  African  and Mexican consumers  favour  more  foreign products  (see Bara  et  al., 
2000). Hence, firms producing in LDC have greater difficulties to penetrate the developed countries 
markets. This, in part, may explain why outward foreign direct investments in industrial sectors 
from developing countries (especially from Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, the republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and South Africa) to developed countries are becoming important (UNCTAD, 2004).  
For example, the most important destination of for Indian and Chinese foreign direct investments 
                                                 
1 “customer voting” is related to the phenomenon where a consumer, by deciding to avoid or purchase a 
country’s  product,  votes  pro  or  contra  the  policies  and  practices  of  its  government  (Smith,  1990).  This 
phenomenon include also ethical considerations (Grolleau et al., 2004). 
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0  3 
has been the United States between 2001 and 2003 while investment activities in Europe from 
Korean and Taiwanese companies have grown over the last decade. 
  This paper aims at evaluating the effects of foreign products’ perceptions on trade, capital 
location and welfare. To address this issue, we provide a two country model with monopolistic 
competition and capital mobility. Countries are only distinguished from each other by differences in 
attitudes towards foreign products. This type of differentiation induced by the country of origin is 
not studied in existing models of trade and location. The model developed by Neven et al. (1991) is 
a notable exception because they consider that demand is subject to national product bias. However, 
they assume no capital mobility between countries, while in our model it is endogenous. We will 
see that some unsuspected results emerge when we take into account the mobility of capital. 
Our first result is in line with standard analysis. Consumers living in the developed country 
always benefit from a rise in the knowledge of foreign products as long as the location of capital 
remains  unchanged.  In  this  case,  they  consume  more  varieties  and  prices  decrease  due  to  an 
increasing  price  competition  between  domestic  firms  and  foreign  firms.  However,  taking  into 
account the mobility of capital reveals new results. First, the developing country hosts more and 
more  firms  (or  capital)  at  the  expense  of  the  developed  country  as  the  perception  of  product 
improves. Second, and as a direct consequence of the previous result, the surplus of consumers in the 
developed country can decrease when perception of foreign products improves, whereas the surplus 
of developing country consumers increases. In other words, a better perception of foreign varieties 
produced in developing countries favours the convergence of economies. This result means that the 
international  integration of  product  markets  and that  the  international harmonisation of  attitudes 
towards foreign products have opposite effects on the inequalities among nations since economic 
geography models show that a fall in trade costs fosters inequalities between countries (see Fujita et 
al., 1999 and Fujita and Thisse, 2002). 
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0  4 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present formally the main 
assumptions  of  the  model.  In  section  3,  we  study  the  consequences  of  better  perception  about 
varieties  produced  in  developing  countries  for  the  prices,  rental  rate  of  capital  and  consumer’s 
surplus  when  the  location  of  capital  is  exogenous.  The  impact  of  better  perception  of  foreign 
products on the international allocation of capital is studied in section 4 while a welfare analysis is 
performed in section 5 by considering the equilibrium allocation of capital. Section 6 concludes and 
gives some suggestions for future theoretical investigations. 
 
2.  Model and some preliminary results 
2.1. General assumption. 
The economy is made up of two countries, labelled H (the home country or developed country) and F 
(the foreign or developing country). There are two sectors, a traditional sector (T) and a modern 
sector (M). The M sector produces a continuum of varieties of a horizontally differentiated product, 
using capital as only input. The T sector produces a homogenous good (the numéraire), using labour 
as only input. The economy is endowed with k units of capital and 2L consumers/workers. Workers 
supply their units of labour inelastically and are not internationally mobile. Consumers have a love 
for variety of differentiated product. Capital is perfectly mobile between countries and is owned by 
workers, who also supply inelastically their units of capital. In order to focus on effects of product 
knowledge  on  the  international  allocation  of  capital  and  welfare,  we  assume  that  technology, 
endowment in consumers and preferences are identical whatever the country.  
Each consumer living in country H (resp., F) is willing to buy a share qF (resp. qH) of 
varieties produced in country F (resp., H). There is no imports (qF=0) when each consumer values 
very negatively a foreign country while all varieties produced in the foreign country are imported   
when consumers do not attach a negative value to foreign products (qF=1). In addition, an increase in 
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0  5 
qF from 0 to 1 means that the perception of varieties produced in country F improves and more 
products are imported from country F.
2 
 One can show that, when qF=qH, full dispersion of capital is the only equilibrium spatial 
configuration, whatever the trade costs. A more interesting situation arises in the case where qF<qH.
3 
Because our qualitative results depend only on the wedge between qF and qH, the representative 
consumer in country F is assumed to know all goods produced in country H (qH=1), without loss of 
generality and let  F q q º . In other words, all varieties produced in country H benefit from a good 
perception of consumers living in country F and only prices determine the choice. Therefore, country 
F is the developing country, as it is more difficult for varieties produced in this country to reach the 
other country. 
Notice finally that q can also be interpreted differently. Indeed, 1 q -  can reflect the share 
varieties for which import to country F is prohibited by the government of country H. In different 
countries, governments, labour unions, industry groups sponsor campaign in order to establish of a 
“buy domestic” norm. 
2.2. Consumption 
 Following Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), preferences are identical across workers located in 












= - - +  
  ∫ ∫ ∫                 (1) 
where a>0, β>γ>0 are exogenous parameters, q(i) is the quantity of variety iÎ[0,n] and z the quantity 
of the numéraire. In this expression, a measures the intensity of preferences for the differentiated 
                                                 
2 Note that  q does not measure the (dis)utility that consumers incur from buying the foreign good, as in 
Neven  et  al.  (1991).  In  our  case,  it  measure  the  share  of  varieties  produced  in  the  foreign  country  that 
consumers are willing to buy.  
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0  6 
product with respect to the numéraire. The condition β>γ implies that workers have a preference for 
variety.  Each  worker  is  endowed  with  z’>0  units  of  the  numéraire.  The  initial  endowment  is 
supposed to be large enough for the consumption of the numéraire to be strictly positive at the 
market  outcome.  His  budget  constraint  can  then  be  written  as  follows: 
0 ( ) ( ) '
N
p i q i di z w z + = + ∫ where w  is the  individual's  income  and p(i)  is the consumer  price of 
variety i. 
The average number of products from country F that a representative consumer from country 
H  is  willing  to  buy  is  F n q .  Given  the  assumption  of  symmetry  between  varieties,  solving  the 
consumption problem yields the individual demand function for variety i produced in country j=H, F 
from a representative consumer located in country H: 




' ', ' and ' '
( ) H F




b g g q b g
º º º
- + + -
 
where  jH p is the price of a variety prevailing in country H produced in country j and PH the price 
index in country H given by H H HH F FH P n p n p q = + ,  HH p  (resp.,  FH p ) being the price of each 
variety produced in country H (resp., F) and consumed in country H. 
Given  that  consumers/workers  in  country  F  are  willing  to  buy  all  varieties  produced  in 
country H, their individual demand function is the following:  
[ ( )] jF H F jF F q a b c n n p cP = - + + +                  (3) 
where  
                                                                                                                                                  
3 The case qF>qH yields symmetrical results since countries are symmetric in endowment, preferences and 
technology.   
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1
, and
( ) H F




b g g b g
º º º
- + + -
 
with  F F FF H HF P n p n p = + ,  FF p  (resp.,  HF p ) being the price of each variety produced in country F 
(resp., H) and consumed in country F. 
2.3. Production. 
The traditional sector produces a homogeneous good under perfect competition and constant returns 
to scale. One unit of output requires one unit of labour. The T good is costlessly traded between 
countries so that its price is the same everywhere (which is why that good is the natural choice for 
the numéraire). This implies that the price of the T good and, at the equilibrium, the workers’ wage 
is equal to one everywhere. 
The  modern  sector  supplies  varieties  under  increasing  returns  to  scale  and  monopolistic 
competition. The production of any variety requires one unit of capital. There exists a one to one 
correspondence between firms and varieties, so that  n k = . We consider a market structure with 
monopolistic competition with free entry. Varieties of M good are traded at a cost of t units of the 
numéraire per unit shipped between the two countries. In addition, we assume that markets are 
internationally segmented so that each firm chooses a delivered price, which is specific to the country 
in which its variety is sold. As firms bear trade costs and assuming one unit of capital per firm (n = 
k),  and  denoting  H r   (resp.  F r )  the  rental  rate  of  capital  in  country  H  (resp.  F),  profits  of  a 
representative firm in country H are as follows: 
( ) H HH HH HF HF H p q L p t q L r p = + - -                          (4) 
and in country F are given by: 
( ) F FF FF FH FH F p q L p t q L r p q = + - -                                                      (5) 
When producers maximise profits, they take price indices as given. Nevertheless, the market 
as a whole has a non negligible impact on each firm's choice in that each firm must account for the 
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0  8 
distribution of all firms' prices through an aggregate statistics (the price index) in order to find its 
equilibrium price. Thus, the market solution is given by a Nash equilibrium with a continuum of 
players in which prices are interdependent. The profit maximising prices are given by: 
2 ( )







a b g gq








p p = +        (6b) 
2 ( )
















p p = +         (7b) 
   As firms’ prices net of trade costs are to be positive for any distribution of firms, we 




) ( 2 g b a
trade t t    
where 
  ( ) 2( ) 0 H F n n g b g L º + + - >    
This condition also guarantees that it is always profitable for a firm to export to the other country. 
 
3. Prices, rental rates of capital and consumer’s surplus 
 In order to disentangle the different mechanisms at work, it is both relevant and convenient to 
distinguish between we call short run equilibrium, in which capital is supposed to be immobile, i.e. 
H n  and  F n  are exogenous and, a long run equilibrium when capital is internationally mobile, i.e. 
H n  and  F n  are endogenous. In this section, we study the impact of q  on (i) equilibrium prices; (ii) 
rental rate of capital and (iii) consumer’s surplus, when the spatial distribution of firms is given. 
3.1. Prices 
It is easy to check that  
 
[( 2( )] 2 ( ))
0
2( ( ) 2( ))²
HH F H
H F
p n n t
n n
g g b g a b g
q g q b g
¶ + - - -
= £
¶ + + -
 when t £ ttrade  
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and   







In words, a better perception of varieties produced in the developing country (country F) decreases 
the prices prevailing in the developed country (country H). This means that better perception on 
varieties increases the price competition among producers serving market H since more varieties are 
imported from country F. Note that, because markets are segmented, prices in country F are not 
affected by attitudes  towards foreign products of consumers living in country H. 
3.2. Rental rate of capital 
Due to free entry and exit, there are no profits in equilibrium. This implies that operating profits are 
equal  to  the  fixed  cost  paid  in  terms  of  capital.  In  other  words,  the  equilibrium  rental  rate  is 
determined by a bidding process for capital, which ends when no firm can earn a strictly positive 
profit at the equilibrium market price. Hence, by introducing (2) (resp., (3)) into (6a) and (7b) (resp., 
(6b) and (7a)) and by using  0 H p =  and  0 F p = , the equilibrium rental rate of capital located in 
countries H and F given by, respectively,  
2 2 [( ) ( /2) ]/( ) H HH FF r L p p t b g = + - -                 (8) 
2 2 [( ) ( /2) ]/( ) F FF HH r L p p t q b g = + - -                (9) 








so that the relationship between q and rental rate of capital in the developed country (country H) is 
negative due to price competition when the spatial allocation of firms is exogenous. However, the 
impact on the rental rate of capital in country F is ambiguous. On the one hand, a rise in q increases 
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0  10 
the effective market potential in country H for a firm located in country F. But as it increases price 
competition in country H, it causes a fall of prices. However, a bit of algebra shows that 




n n b g g q
q
¶   = - + -  
¶  
 
As a consequence, we have  / F r q ¶ ¶ >0 as long as there are not more firms in country F than in 
country H (which, as we shall see, is always the case). In other words, without relocation of capital, 
an improve in the perception of varieties produced in the developing country increases rental rates of 
capital in this nation and decreases rental rates prevailing in the developed country. 
3.3. Consumer’s surplus 
The expression of surplus for a consumer living in country H is given by:
4 
( )






' '( ) '
2 2
H F
H H HH F FH
H F
H HH F FH H HH F FH
a n n
S a n p n p
b
b c n n c








+ + - +
           (10) 
while the consumer surplus of an individual residing in country F is expressed as follows: 
( )





F H HF F FF
H HF F FF H HF F FF
a n
S a n p n p
b
b cn c
n p n p n p n p
= - +
+
+ + - +
  (11) 
where  
0
H H H HH
HH
dS S S p












Consequently, for a given spatial allocation of firms, better perception on varieties raises the 
surplus of consumers in country H since more varieties are consumed and because of decreasing 
                                                 
4 Due to the introduction of q , the expression of the surplus differs from Ottaviano et al. (2002). 
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prices. In addition, for a given spatial allocation of firms, the surplus of consumers in country F is not 
directly affected by the change in the perception parameter, since we have  / 0 FF p q ¶ ¶ = . 
  To summarize, 
Proposition 1. Assume that the location of capital is fixed. When the perception of foreign products 
improves, the consumer’s surplus only raises in the developed country whereas the rental rate of 
capital decreases in this country and increases in the developing country. 
 
4. Asymmetry in perception of foreign products and capital location 
We now analyse the role of the perception parameter q on the location of capital. As there exists a 
one to one correspondence between firms and capital (n k = ), we can write 
(1 ) H F n n n n l l = = -  
where l is the share of capital or firms located in country H. The location of capital depends on the 
spatial differential of rental rates. A spatial equilibrium is such that, in each country, no firm has an 
incentive to change location, conditional upon the fact that the markets clear at the equilibrium 
prices. Formally, a spatial equilibrium arises at lÎ]0,1[ when  ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0 H F r r r l q l q l q D = - = , or 
at l=0 if  ( , ) 0 r l q D £ , or at l=1 if  ( , ) 0 r l q D ³ . Such equilibrium always exists because  ( , ) r l q D  
is a continuous function of λ (Ginsburgh et al., 1985). An interior equilibrium (lÎ(0,1)) is stable if 
and only if the slope of the profit differential is negative in a neighbourhood of the equilibrium 
( ( , )/ 0 d r d l q l D < ,), whereas agglomerated equilibria (l = 0,1) are always stable whenever they 
exist. 
Given (8) and (9), the difference in rental rates of capital between the developed country and 
the developing country is given by: 
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q
l q q q
b g
  -
D = - + - +   -  
            (12). 
  Observe that  ( , )/ 0 d r d l q l D <  for  [0,1] lÎ because pHH is a decreasing function of l 
while pFF an increasing function of l. In other words, the slope of  r(l,q) is never positive or null. 
This  means  that  full  agglomeration  in  the  developing  country  is  never  an  equilibrium  spatial 
configuration. To summarize, 
Lemma 1. There exists a single spatial equilibrium for each combination of parameters (a positive 
share of firms in country F or full agglomeration in country H). 
To determine the spatial equilibrium, we analyse three subcases:  1 q =  (case 1),  0 q =  (case 
2) and 1 0 q > >  (case 3).  
No negative perception of foreign products ( 1 q = ). 
 Because the purpose of the paper is the impact of attitudes towards of foreign products on location, 
it is important to establish as our benchmark how the spatial allocation of firms is characterised under 
the assumption for which the country of origin does not matter in consumption. Assuming q =1 and 














Clearly, the full dispersion of capital (
* 1/2 l = ) is the single spatial equilibrium. When all 
consumers do not attach negative values to foreign products ( 1 q = ), price competition discourages a 
higher concentration of firms in a single country. This result contrasts with a classical result of new 
economic geography literature, showing that the dispersion of activities is not a stable equilibrium 
when transport costs are low enough (see Fujita et al., 1999 and Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Our result 
arises  from  the  absence  of  circular  mechanisms  leading  to  agglomeration  such  as  input output 
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linkages. This feature of our model is not problematic, as is allows us to focus on the effects of 
perception of foreign products. To sum up, 
Proposition 2. When the country of origin does not matter in consumption ( 1 q = ), dispersion of 
capital is favoured. 
4.2. No imports of varieties produced in the developing country ( 0 q = ). 
 Suppose now that q=0. In this case, a firm located in the developing country (country F) cannot 
export to the developed country. We obtain the following proposition: 













When t*<t<ttrade, there is a unique stable equilibrium involving partial agglomeration in country H. 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
This proposition means that the agglomeration of the production is favoured when firms 
located in country F have no opportunity to serve country H. In this case, the location of production 
in  country  H  allows  firms  to  serve  both  markets.  However,  under  certain  conditions,  it  can  be 
profitable to locate in country F even though firms do not export. Indeed, the spatial concentration of 
all capital does not occur when trade costs are high enough. This result requires some comments. 
Remember that price competition works against agglomeration. Indeed, when trade costs are high 
enough,  firms  producing  in  country  F  can  set  high  prices.  Further,  the  share  of  local  varieties 
consumption in total consumption in country F rises when trade barriers increases. This is due to a 
substitution  effect  between  local  varieties  and  varieties  produced  in  country  H.  Note  that  this 
substitution effect is amplified when the degree of product differentiation is low. As a result, some 
units of capital are prompted to set up in country F in order to benefit from higher price and demand 
Author-produced version of the article published in Open economies review, Volume 21, Issue 5, November 2010, Pages 751-770.





































0  14 
when trade costs are high enough or when products are weakly differentiated. However, when trade 
costs become sufficiently low, all firms set up in a single country. 
4.3. The intermediate case (1 0 q > > ).  
Finally,  suppose  that  1 0 q > > .  We  first  determine  the  threshold  value  (q )  below  which  full 
agglomeration remains a stable equilibrium. When all mobile firms are located in country H, the 
spatial differential of rental rates is expressed as follows: 
[ ] 0 1 2 (1, ) (2 ( ) )² ²
4 ²( )
nL
r t t t q a b g q r r r
b g
D = - - -L + + +
L -
 
where r0 , r1 and r2 are a combination of the exogenous parameters defined in Appendix A. We also 
know  from  this  appendix  that  0
2
2 1 0 > + + t t r r r   for  0<t<t*.  Agglomeration  remains  a  stable 




)² ) ( 2 (
²
1 0



































<  for admissible values of t.  
Hence,  
Proposition 4. When  ) 1 , 0 ( Î q  a better perception of varieties produced in country F reduces the 
interval of trade costs in which full agglomeration is a spatial equilibrium. 
This  proposition  confirms  the  intuitive  implications  of  propositions  1  and  2.  The  more 
accessible the developed country is from country F, the more capital tends to settle in the developed 
country (country H). Moreover,  0 / < dt dq  implies that the higher the trade costs, the lower the 
perception threshold above which industry settles in country F (see figure 1). High trade costs thus 
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implies a dispersion effect, as in most of economic geography models, but here stemming from a 
quite different mechanism. 
Figure 1 about here 
Finally, we determine the spatial equilibrium when  ) 1 , (q q Î  or when t*<t<ttrade. Some 
tedious calculations show that  (1/2, ) 0 r q D > . As a result, given  that  ( , )/ 0 d r d l q l D < , partial 
agglomeration (
* (0,1) l Î ) occurs in country H when  ) 1 , (q q Î  and when t*<t<ttrade. This result 
shows that the distribution of firms is always biased in favour of the developed country, which is not 
surprising,  given  the  assumptions  favouring  goods  produced  in  this  country.  In  addition,  the 
relationship between l













because  / 0 d r dq D <   (recall  that  / 0 H dr dq <   and  / 0 F dr dq > )  and  / 0 d r dl D < .  Hence, 
* (1/2,1) l Î  depends negatively on  ( ,1) q q Î . In other words, when the perception of varieties 
produced  in  country  F  improves,  starting  from  low  levels,  the  economy  moves  gradually  from 
agglomeration to dispersion.  
The previous results are summarised in the following proposition and illustrated in figure 1. 
Proposition  5.  When  ) 1 , (q q Î   or  when  t*<t<ttrade,  partial  agglomeration  of  capital  occurs  in 
country H. Moreover, a better perception of varieties produced in countryF reduces gradually the 
international inequalities in terms of activity level. 
To conclude this section, we have shown that the international convergence in the perception of 
foreign products and commodities prices have opposite effects on international allocation of capital. 
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5.  Capital income, consumers’ surplus and perception of foreign products 
We now give some elements on the evolution of rental rates of capital and consumer’s surplus when 
the perception of foreign products varies. In section 3, we have shown that, at location of firms 
given, the rental rate of capital located in country F depends positively on q and the rental rate of 
capital in country H diminishes when q increases while consumers’ surplus only raises in country H. 
However, the analysis is now more complex since the spatial distribution of capital is influenced by 
attitudes towards foreign goods. It is worth stressing that when full agglomeration of capital occurs 
(for example for very low values of trade costs), a better perception of varieties produced in country 
F does not affect the results obtained in section 3 because q  has no impact on the capital location. In 
what follows, we study the most interesting configuration where capital is located in both countries 
(q q > ). 
5.1.  Capital income. 
Regardless of their location, the rental rate for each unit of capital reaches the same value at the 
equilibrium  allocation  of  capital.  Because  we  have 
* * * * ( ) H F r r r l = =   as  well  as 
* * 2 * (1 )( ) / (1 ) /4 FF HH HH p p t p t q q q = - + + - (see  (12)), the equilibrium rental rate of capital is given by 
2 * *
* * * 2 ( /2)[ (1 ) (1 )/2]
( , ) ( )
HH HH
HH





b g b g
  - - + +
= +  
- -  
 
Because  of  the  very  intricate  nature  of  the  relationship  between  q  and 
* l , given  implicitly  by 
* * ( , ) r q l D , one  cannot  provide  analytical  results  on  the  relationship  between  q and 
* * ( ) r l . 
However, it is straightforward to check that a rise in q decreases the export revenue of firms in 
country H (given by (pFF t/2)
2/(b g)) and the local sales of firms located in country F (expressed as 
(pFF)
2/(b g))  since  pFF  declines.  Those  negative  effects  are  higher  when  trade  costs  are  high. 
Numerical simulations are required in order to analyse how q influences the rental rate of capital. 
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The  outcome  depends  on  the  relative  values  of  trade  costs  (see  Appendix  B.1).  Numerical 
illustrations exhibit an inverted U shape relationship between the knowledge of foreign products and 
rental rates of capital when trade costs take intermediate value. When t is relatively low (resp., high), 
the relationship is positive (resp., negative). Hence, simulations suggest that a better perception of 
varieties produced in the developing country increases the equilibrium rental rate of capital when 
trade costs are low enough.  
In section 3, we have shown that rental rates of capital decrease when the perception of 
foreign  products  improves  as  long  as  the  spatial  organisation  of  production  does  not  change. 
However, when trade costs are low, better perception of foreign varieties raises the share of capital 
located in country F, increasing prices in country H, and thus the rental rate of capital. Conversely, 
returns of capital may decrease when trade costs are high enough because, under this condition, the 
relative intensity of price competition is high.  
5.2. Consumer’s surplus 
We now analyse the consumer’s surplus. The expressions of surplus for a consumer living in country 
H  and  country  F  are  given  by  (10)  and  (11)  respectively.  Remember  that  / 0 H S q ¶ ¶ >   and 
/ 0 F S q ¶ ¶ =   when  the  location  of  capital  is  given.  The  analysis  of  consumers’  surplus  is  more 
complex when the international distribution of capital is endogenous. Some tedious (but standard) 
calculations reveal that  / 0 H S l ¶ ¶ >  and  / 0 F S l ¶ ¶ < . More varieties produced in a country raise 
the surplus of its residents because of a fall in local prices.  Hence, we have: 
* * * * * * *
* * *
0 0
H H H HH H HH
HH HH
dS S S p S p
d p p
l
q q q l q
+ - - - - -
> <
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= + +
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
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It appears that a better perception in country H of foreign products leads to an increasing surplus 
of consumers living in country F since an increasing number of varieties are produced in country F, 
inducing  lower local prices.  
The effect of a better perception of varieties produced in country F on the surplus of consumers 
living in country H is now ambiguous because they are two competing effects. On the one hand, 
more varieties are consumed by inhabitants of country H. On the other hand, when the perception of 
foreign products improves, more varieties are produced in the foreign country. This negative ‘re 
allocation’ effect on the surplus of consumers living in country H is higher when trade costs are low 
because  price  competition  is  fiercer.  We  have  to  resort  to  numerical  simulations  to  derive  the 
qualitative effect of a variation in q, because of the very intricate nature of the relationship between q 
and l. We consider the same values of parameters used to analyse the rental rates of capital (see 
Appendix B.2.). Even though consumers have a love for variety, simulations reveal that consumer’s 
surplus in country H can depend negatively on q when trade costs are low enough.
5 In other words, 
Proposition 5. Assume that capital is internationally mobile. A better perception of varieties 
produced in the foreign country raises the surplus of consumers in the foreign country and, under 
some of condition, decreases the surplus of consumers in the home country. 
 Hence, the inhabitants of the developed countries are generally interested in keeping a low 
number of imported products  in terms of  consumer’s  surplus, contrary  to the  inhabitants of  the 
developing countries.  However, the improvement of perception of foreign products can raise the 
capital income when trade integration is sufficiently high. It finally should be noted that national 
welfare  (
* * /2 A S L r n + )  may  decrease  in  the  developed  country,  as  suggested  by  numerical 
                                                 
5 Recall that the negative effect arising from the mobility of capital is higher when trade costs are low enough. 
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illustrations  in  Appendix  B.3.
6  Gains  in  revenue  from  capital  can  be  lower  than  the  losses  in 
consumers’ surplus when perception of foreign products improves. 
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
Despite the stylised assumptions of this model, we were able to give some insights about the effects 
of perceptions of varieties produced in the developing countries. When capital is internationally 
mobile, we show that the developing country hosts more and more firms (or capital) at the expense 
of the developed country as perception of varieties produced in the developed country improves. As 
a direct consequence of this result, the surplus of consumers and the capital income in the developed 
country may decrease when the perception of foreign products improves whereas the surplus of 
developing country consumers increases.  
Our framework is a first step to incorporate explicitly the effects of country of origin in models 
of trade and location. Our framework could be extended to take into account the diffusion of interest 
for  foreign  products  among  nationals  due  to  word to mouth  communication  maintained  by 
immigrants. Several empirical studies reveal the crucial role of social networks in international and 
interregional trade (Head and Ries, 1998). 
                                                 
6 We assume here that workers own an equal share of capital. This result holds for all distributions of capital 
owners, even when all of them are located in the developed country.  
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Appendix A. Proof of proposition 2 
We  show  that  the  full  agglomeration  is  a  stable  equilibrium  when 
* t t < .  We  know  that 
dDr(l,q)/dl<0, so in order to prove that l=1 is a spatial equilibrium, we must have that (1,0) 0 r D > . 
When l=1, the spatial differential of rental rate of capital is given by: 
( )
2
0 1 2 2 (1,0)
4( )
L
r t t r r r
b g





1 2 4 ( ) 0 4 ( ) 0 [ 2( )] O n r a b g r a b g r g b g º - > º - - L < º L - + -  
so that  (1,0) 0 r D >  when t=0.   
















It is easy to check that t0
*>0. Indeed, the numerator and denominator are always of the same sign: 
2 0 2( ) 0 n n g g b g L - L > Û - + - > (and vice versa). Further, we can also check that t0*<ttrade or 
equivalently  2 2( ) n n g g b g L - L < - + -  or  n n > . As a consequence, we have  (1,0) 0 r D >  for 
0<t<t*, and  (1,0) 0 r D <  for t*<t< ttrade when n n > . 





2( ) 2( )
trade trade
n n
t t t t t
n n
g g
g b g g b g
L- L L+ L
º < < º
- + - - + -
 
It is easy to check that 
*
0 trade t t <  or equivalently  2 2( ) n n g g b g L + L < - + -  or,  n n < . It is also 
straightforward to see that 
*
1 trade t t > . As a consequence, for admissible values of t,  (1,0) 0 r D <  if and 
only if t>t0* ≡ t*. 
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When
* t t > and  0 q = , it is straightforward that the partial agglomeration (
* 1 1/2 l > > ) takes 
place. Indeed, we have  (1/2,0) 0 r D > . Since dDr(l,q)/dl<0, at the spatial equilibrium, we have 
* 1 1/2 l > >  when 
* t t > and  0 q = . 
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Appendix B. Numerical illustrations  
Following figures show how rental rate of capital, consumer’s surplus and national welfare in the 
developed country  (country  H)  changes  as  q increases  when  capital  is  mobile.   The  values of 
parameters are:  4, 2, 1and 1 n a b g = = = =  so that  8/3 trade t = . Four values of t have been analysed: 
t=1; t=1,5; t=2; t=2,5. Note that  19/25 q = when t=1 and  0 q < when  1,5 t ³  
 
B .1 Rental rates of Capital 
 
 




t=1,5  t=1 
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B.2  Consumer’s surplus in country H. 
 
 
   
 





t=1,5  t=1 
Author-produced version of the article published in Open economies review, Volume 21, Issue 5, November 2010, Pages 751-770.





































0  25 












t=1,5  t=1 
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